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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the incorporation of international obligations into domestic law 
through the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, specifically with regard to the right to be free 
from torture and other ill treatment. New Zealand is bound by a range of obligations at 
international law, to take steps to prevent acts of torture and other ill treatment. This paper looks at 
New Zealand's obligations under the United Nations Convention Against Torture 1984 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, and examines the extent to which these 
obligations have been utilised by New Zealand courts when interpreting the scope the Bill of 
Rights. It then outlines the approach taken on this issue by the European Court of Human Rights, 
the United Kingdom courts and the Canadian courts. The paper then considers some difficulties 
the courts face in reading these obligations and concludes that, despite these difficulties, an 
effective and robust protection of the right to be free from torture and other ill treatment requires 
these obligations to be read into the Bill of Rights. 
Word Length: The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, and 
bibliography) comprises 15,109 words. 
Key Words: 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
International obligations-Incorporation-Domestic law 
I INTRODUCTION 
The right to be free from torture and other cruel , inhuman , or degrading 
treatment or punishment 1 is extensively protected worldwide, through both 
international and domestic law. This right is enshrined in the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 ("the Bill of Rights") in both sections 9, which protects the right 
to be free from torture or cruel, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment 
or punishment, and 23(5) , which protects the right of individuals deprived of 
liberty to be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the 
person . New Zealand is also bound at international law to protect this right, 
namely by its ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Torture 1984 
("UNCAT") and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
("the ICCPR"). UNCAT specifically focuses on this right, and after 178 
ratifications ,2 it is widely held to reflect the international consensus on the 
prohibition on torture. Both UNCAT and the ICCPR impose a number of duties 
upon States parties , such as prosecuting alleged offenders and investigating 
allegations of torture or other ill treatment, to ensure the effective protection of 
this right. 
These obligations have not been explicitly incorporated into the domestic 
law of New Zealand. As such, the traditional "dualist" position dictates that there 
is an obligation on New Zealand to fulfil these duties , but no obligation in New 
Zealand. International law is only applicable in domestic law to the extent that it 
has been incorporated into domestic law, thus these obligations cannot be 
enforced domestically. However, the Supreme Court, with reliance on UNCAT 
and the ICCPR, has recently read an implied obligation to not return or extradite a 
person to a country where they face a substantial 1isk of torture into section 9 of 
the Bill of Rights .3 This raises the question to what extent the other obligations 
required by UNCAT and the ICCPR can be implied into the Bill of Rights , and 
thus enforceable in domestic law . 
1 For ease of purpose, "other cruel , inhuman or degrading treatment or puni shment" will 
hereinafter be referred to as "other ill treatment." 
2 Office o f the United Nations High Commiss ioner for Human Ri ghts "Status of ratification of the 
Convention against Torture as of 2 November 2004 www.ohchr.org/engli sh/law/cat-ratify.htm 
(last accessed l October 2007). 
3 Zaoui v Attorn ey-Genera/ (No 2) [2006] l NZLR 289, 321 (SC) Keith J for the Court. 
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This paper will attempt to answer that question. It begins with a brief 
survey of the purposes and the legal prohibition of torture and other ill treatmen
t. 
Part III describes the origins of UNCAT and the duties it imposes on Stat
es 
parties. Part IV describes the protection against torture and other ill treatme
nt 
provided for in Articles 7 and 10(1) of the ICCPR, and outlines the obligatio
ns 
imposed on States parties in order to ensure these rights are effectively protected
. 
Part V summarises the New Zealand position on the incorporation of these 
obligations through the Bill of Rights, and Part VI provides a comparison with t
he 
approaches taken by the European Court of Human Rights , the United Kingdo
m 
and Canada. 
Part VII discusses the difficulties with imposing these obligations on the 
State through the Bill of Rights. The legislative under-incorporation of the
se 
obligations and the process theory of rights upon which the Bill of Rights w
as 
based present potential hurdles for reading these obligations into the Bill 
of 
Rights. Also, the non-justiciability of many of the obligations may impede t
he 
courts from entering judgement on the fulfilment of these obligations 
Ultimately, however, this paper concludes that those hurdles can and 
should be overcome. The obligations New Zealand is under to provide effectiv
e 
protection against torture and other ill treatment requires these obligations to 
be 
incorporated through the Bill of Rights. 
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II BACKGROUND ON TORTURE 
A Purpose of the Prohibition on Torture 
1 Historical Focus on Physical Integrity 
The prohibition on torture originated from the protection of physical 
integrity against extreme forms of punishment. Those origins can be seen in the 
prohibition of 'cruel and unusual punishment' in Article 10 of the Bill of Rights 
1688 and other early bills of rights. 4 The common Jaw also recognised that 'every 
person's body is inviolate' as a fundamental principle, thus protecting physical 
integrity. The common Jaw was specifically motivated to disallow the use of 
torture by: 5 
the cruelty of the practice as applied to those not convicted of crime, by the 
inherent unreliability of confessions or evidence so procured and by the belief 
that it degraded all those who lent themselves to the practice. 
2 Modern Focus on Inherent Dignity 
Many contemporary human rights instruments aim to protect the 'inherent 
dignity of the person .' 6 The concept of ' inherent dignity ' goes wider than just 
physical security. Acts that degrade or humiliate a person also infringe upon 
dignity. In recognition of this, most modem human tights instruments protect 
against other ill treatment that violates a person's dignity, while not being 
sufficiently severe to constitute torture. This category of 'other ill treatment' was 
originally described in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 ("the 
4 For example, the Eighth Amendment of the US Constitution. 
5 A and others v Secreta,y of State for the Home Department ( No 2) [2006] 2 AC 221, 246 (HL) 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill. 
6 For example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 
UNTS 171, preamble. 
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UDHR") as "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."
7 Subsequent human rights 
instruments have mostly adhered to this formulation.
8 
Individuals who are deprived of liberty are particularly vulnerable
 to 
degrading or humiliating treatment. In recognition of this, many hu
man rights 
instruments outline the specific right of detainees to humane treatment.
9 This right 
encompasses the right to be free from torture, and imposes a specific ob
ligation on 
States to ensure the humane treatment of detainees. 
Contemporary human rights instruments also extend the protection aga
inst 
torture and other ill treatment to encompass both punishment and treat
ment. This 
broadens the scope of the protection beyond the criminal law, and ha
s seen the 
right to be free from to11ure and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
 treatment 
utilised in a wide variety of contexts. 
10 
B The Legal Prohibition on Torture 
1 lntemational Law 
There is an extensive web of prohibition of torture and other ill treatm
ent 
at international law. Article 5 of the UDHR, the source of many 
subsequent 
human rights instruments, reads "No one shall be subjected to torture 
or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment." Similar language is found in Artic
le 7 of the 
ICCPR, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("th
e ECHR"), 
Article 5(2) of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and A
rticle 5 of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. Common Article 3 o
f the 1949 
Geneva Conventions prohibits the ill treatment of certain classes 
of people. 
7 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948) NRES/TII
/217, art 5.1 will use the 
term 'other ill treatment ' in reference to this formulation. 
8 For example, see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a
bove n 6, art 7. European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freed
oms ( 4 November 1950) 
213 UNTS 221, art 3. 
9 
For example, New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 23(5) Internationa
l Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, above n 6, Article 10(1). 
'
0 Such as immigration law and assessing the adequacy of prison detention
 conditions. 
5 
Specific conventions which provide for mechanisms for the prevention against 
torture have also been enacted. 11 
The prohibition on torture is considered to be a fundamental and non-
derogable right. It is also generally accepted that the prohibition on torture is a 
'jus cogens' or peremptory norm, and applies to all States regardless of whether 
they have become a party to a particular international instrument.12 
2 Domestic Law 
While the content of domestic bills of rights around the world tends to 
differ, virtually all of them contain a core set of civil and political rights, including 
the right to be free from torture. 13 Many constitutional bills of rights protect the 
security of the person. For example, section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms 1982 ("the Canadian Charter") guarantees the right "not to be 
subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment", while section 7 
protects the broader right to " life, liberty and security of the person." The Eight 
Amendment of the United States Constitution 1791 borrows the phrase from the 
Bill of Rights 1688 and protects against "cruel and unusual punishments." Section 
9 of the Bill of Rights provides everyone with the "1ight not to be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, degrading, or disproportionately severe treatment or 
punishment." The term "disproportionately severe" is unique to New Zealand. 14 
3 The Need for Stronger Measures 
Despite the extensive web of prohibition at domestic and international law 
post-World War Two, widespread use of torture and other ill treatment has 
continued to be carried out by States against individuals. During the 1970s, this 
11 For example, the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (10 December 1984) 1465 UNTS 112; European Convention 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (11 November 
1987) 1561 UNTS 363; and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture 1985. 
12 A Butler and P Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Co111111e!ltary ((LexisNexis NZ Ltd, 
Wellington, 2005) 224. See also, R v Bow Street Magistrate, exp Pi!lochet Ugarte (No 3) [1999] 2 
WLR 827. 
13 Philip Alston (ed) Pro111oti11g Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives 
(OUP, Oxford, 1997) 2, Butler 223-224 
14 A Butler and P Butler, above n 12, 223. 
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was exposed, in part, by the worldwide Campaign for the Abolition of Torture, 
catTied out by Amnesty International. 15 Also, the increasing use of torture by 
autocratic regimes in Latin America to repress domestic opposition received mass 
media attention, serving to raise and solidify public opinion against the use of 
torture. 16 The United Nations General Assembly ("the General Assembly") 
recognised that in light of the alarming reports of torture, "further and sustained 
efforts" were necessary to strengthen the protection against torture and other ill 
treatment at international law. 17 The need for international action was especially 
crucial in light of the State involvement in torture: a domestic legal system could 
not be expected to bring such practices to an end while the State supported 
them.18 
III THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 
A Development 
In 1974, the General Assembly adopted a draft resolution requesting the 
upcoming Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders ("the Congress") to "give urgent attention" to 
strengthening the protection of torture and other ill treatment.
19 
The deliberations of the Congress resulted in the creation of the 
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which was adopted 
by the General Assembly in 1975 ("the Declaration"). 20 The Declaration consists 
15 J H Burgers, and H Danelius The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Handbook 011 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat111e11t or 
Pu11is/1111e11t (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1988) 13. 
16 Ibid, 13. 
17 Ibid, 14. 
18 Ibid , 14. 
19 UNGA "Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment in Relation 
to Detention and Imprisonment" (6 November 1974) A/RES/29/3218(XXX). 
20 United Nations General Assembly "Declaration on the Protection of All Persons From Being 
Subjected To Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment" (9 
December I 975) A/RES/30/3452(XXX). The draft declaration was adopted with only one minor 
amendment - in article 2, where torture and other ill treatment were to be condemned as a denial 
of the principles of the United Nations Charter, the term 'principles' was replaced with 'purposes'. 
See N Rodley The Treatme11t of Prisoners Under lntematio11al Law (2 ed, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1999) 36. 
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of twelve articles. It provides a definition of torture and imposes a general 
obligation on States to 'take effective measures' to prevent torture and other ill 
treatment. It also includes some specific measures. For example, article 5 requires 
States to ensure that the training of, and general rules for, persons charged with 
custody of prisoners must reflect the prohibition on torture and other ill treatment. 
Also, article 6 reqmres States to keep inteJTogation methods and detention 
practices under review. The Declaration was intended to impose a 'moral 
obligation' upon States to ensure their national processes conformed to these 
standards, and to provide the basis for a legally binding convention. 21 
Two years later, the General Assembly requested the Commission on 
Human Rights ("the Commission") to "draw up a draft convention against torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, in light of the 
principles embodied in the Declaration."22 The Swedish government submitted a 
draft text to the Commission, which subsequently formed the basis of the 
Commission's deliberations. The Swedish draft, while coITesponding closely with 
the obligations in the Declaration, included some significant additions. 23 
An open-ended working group of the Commission drafted the UNCAT 
over a pe1iod of seven years. 24 In 1984, the Commission forwarded the text, 
including articles upon which no consensus had been achieved, to the General 
Assembly. The General Assembly made minor changes and on 10 December 
1984, the General Assembly adopted that form of the text, and opened UNCAT 
for signature, ratification and accession. 25 
2 1 Burgers and Danelius , above n 15, 16; N Radley, above n 20, 36. 
22 UNGA "Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment" (8 December 1977) A/RES/32/62, para l. 
23 Burgers and Danelius, above n 15, 35; N Radley, above n 20, 48 . For example, the Swedish 
proposal included a clause preventing States from extraditing or expelling a person to a country 
where reasonable grounds exist to believe that person may be in danger of being tortured or 
subjected to o ther ill treatment (Article 4); a clause establishing universal jurisdiction over 
suspected torturers (Article 8); and implementation procedures establishing a system of 
international supervision similar to the Optional Protocoi of the ICCPR. 
24 A detailed analysis of the working group's deliberations is outside the scope of this paper. For 
reference, see generally Burgers and Danelius above n 15. See also A Boulesbaa "An Analysis of 
the 1984 Draft Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment" (1985-6) Dick J Int ' I L 185. 
25 United Nations Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, above n 11. 
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B Content 
1 The definition of torture 
The definition of torture found in UNCAT follows the definition found in 
the 1975 Declaration. That definition, in tum, was influenced by the elucidation of 
Article 3 of the ECHR by the European Commission of Human Rights 
("European Commission"), in the Greek case in 1969.
26 
A11icle l provides a description of some of the constituent elements of 
torture. To constitute torture, the act must cause severe pain or suffering. The acts 
must be of sufficient gravity to be considered torture under UNCA T. Also, there 
is no indication that the pain must be inflicted systematically. Thus a single, 
isolated act can be considered to constitute torture.
27 The act must be intentional -
accidents or negligent acts which results in pain or suffering do not constitute 
torture. The act must be committed for a particular purpose. Article 1 lists three 
particular purposes, but prefaces them with the term "such ... as", indicating that 
the list is not exhaustive.28 
Article 1 also requires the act of torture to be caITied out by, or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official, or other person in an official capacity. 
Dwing the travaux preparatoires there was debate over whether an act should be 
defined as torture regardless of who committed it. However, the Commission 
eventually decided to limit the application of UNCAT to torture for which State 
authorities could be held responsible. This consensus was reached because the 
UNCAT was aimed at solving the problem of State-sanctioned torture.
29 
Article 1 excludes from the definition of torture "pain or suffering a,ising 
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions."30 This extends the ambit 
of the definition from that found in the 1975 Declaration, which limited the 
26 Report on the Greek case Chapter IV para 1-2, cited in Burgers and Daneilius, above n 15, 49. 
27 Burgers and Danelius, above n 15, 118. 
28 Ibid, 118. 
29 Ibid, 120. 
30 United Nations Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, above n 11, art 1(1) . 
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exception for lawful sanctions to those that were "consistent with the Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners."31 The removal of that qualifier 
means any sanctions which a State presc1ibes by law, even those which might 
otherwise qualify as torture, will not be classified as torture under UNCAT. 
Conversely, a qualified exception would have meant that various forms of 
corporal punishment would be contrary to the UNCAT. This would have given 
UNCAT a role in the refo1m of the penal sanctions in different States, an outcome 
which undoubtedly would have been unacceptable to a number of countries.32 
2 General obligation of states 
Article 2 contains "the general but basic obligations of each State Party to 
promote the objectives of the [UNCAT]."33 It requires States to take "effective 
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures"34 to not only prohibit, but 
also prevent torture. Paragraph 2 outlines the absolute prohibition on torture, 
making it clear that no exceptional situation can justify torture. This is further 
reaffirmed in paragraph 3, which prevents superior orders from being used as a 
justification for torture. 
3 Expulsion, return or extradition 
Article 3 prevents a State from sending an individual to another State 
where that person would be at serious risk of being subjected to torture. This 
article was inspired by the case law of the European Commission, which had 
concluded that the prohibition on torture in Article 3 of the ECHR not only 
obliges States to prevent torture within its own territory, but also to refrain from 
handing a person over to another State where he might be subjected to such 
treatment. 35 Paragraph l prohibits the expulsion, extradition or return 
("refoulement") of such a person, showing a clear link between this provision and 
31 UNGA "Declaration on the Protection of All Persons From Being Subjected To Torture and 
Other Cruel , Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment", above n 20, art 1(1). 
32 Burgers and Danelius, above n 15, 121-122. 
33 Burgers and Danelius, above n 15, 123. 
34 United Nations Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, above n 11 , art 2(1 ). 
35 Burgers and Danelius, above n 15, 125. 
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Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees DATE ("the 
Refugee Convention"). 36 
There needs to be substantial grounds for believing the person would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture before Article 3 applies. The existence of 
such grounds must be assessed in light of the circumstances of the case -
questions of evidence may often be difficult, and it would be unreasonable and 
contrary to the spirit of UNCAT to require full proof of the alleged facts.
37 The 
general human tights record of the State concerned will also be relevant to the 
inquiry, as recognised in paragraph 2. 
4 Prosecution of alleged torturers 
Article 4 requires each State paity to make acts of torture a criminal 
offence in their domestic law, and to ensure it is punishable by appropriately 
severe penalties. 
Article 5 obliges States to establish ju1isdiction over offences of torture on 
the basis of territoriality, the nationality of the offender or, if the State considers it 
appropriate, the nationality of the victim. This sets up a system of universal 
jurisdiction, the aim of which is to ensure an alleged torturer cannot escape the 
consequences of their actions by going to another country.
38 This aim is furthered 
by the provisions of Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
Article 6 requires States to take alleged torturers into custody and 
immediately make preliminary inquiries into the facts, in order to decide whether 
to prosecute or extradite the alleged offender. States patties can choose the 
manner in which to carry out this obligation - existing domestic procedures for 
the detention of suspected offenders and time-limits on custody may be sufficient 
to fulfil this obligation. Article 6 makes clear, however, that a State must instigate 
36 No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to 
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 
37 Burgers and Dane Ii us , above n 15, 127. 
38 Ibid 131. 
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the investigation in a timely manner, so as not to effectively allow the alleged 
offender a safe-haven. 
Article 7 obliges States to either prosecute or extradite an alleged offender. 
Again, this supports the aim of ensuring no safe-havens are available to such 
alleged offenders. While Article 5 lays down the basis for the exercise of such 
jurisdiction, Article 7 requires States to exercise that jurisdiction where the 
alleged offender is present in a country under its jurisdiction.39 
Article 8 aims to remove any legal obstacles that may prevent extradition 
of an alleged torturer to face prosecution. It ensures that any existing extradition 
treaties will be read compatibly with the aims of the UNCAT. Paragraph 1 deems 
offences of torture to be extraditable offences in any extradition treaty already 
existing between States patties, and makes it compulsory to include torture as an 
extraditable offence in any future extradition treaties. Where there is no 
extradition treaty, paragraph 2 allows States to rely on the UNCAT as the legal 
basis for extradition. 
Atticle 9 obliges States to "afford one another the greatest measure of 
assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of any of 
the offences referred to in article 4." This clause recognises that the prosecuting 
State will often be different to the State in which the acts of torture allegedly 
occurred. The provision of evidence and information to the prosecuting State will 
thus be essential for a successful prosecution.40 
5 Preventive measures 
Article 10 requires States parties to include information and education 
regarding the prohibition on torture and other ill treatment in the training of all 
persons who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any 
arrested, detained or imprisoned person. This includes law enforcement personnel , 
civil or military, medical personnel, and public officials. The provision of such 
information is expected to minimise the risk of any person who is involved in the 
39 Ibid, 136. 
40 Ibid, 140. 
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custody of detained persons will catTy out acts of torture or other ill treatment of 
their own initiative. It is also expected to make it more difficult for higher 
authorities to order, encourage or tolerate such practices.
41 
A1ticle 11 provides that each State patty shall systematically review 
inteJTogation rules, instructions, methods, practices and arrangements for the 
custody and treatment of detained, arrested or imprisoned persons, with a view to 
preventing torture. It is not enough to simply lay down rules prohibiting torture 
and other i 11 treatment. States must have procedures in place to reassess those 
rules. If cases of torture or other ill treatment are detected, the rules may need to 
be revised and improved.
42 
Article 12 requtres each State party to ensure there is a prompt and 
impartial investigation by its competent authorities of any suspicion that an act of 
torture or other ill treatment has been committed. Both the elements of 
promptness and impartiality are significant:
43 
Promptness is essential not only in the interest of the victim but also in many 
cases to prevent the acts from occurring again, whether against the same person 
or against someone else. Impartiality is important, since any investigation which 
proceeds from the assumption that no such acts have occurred, or in which there 
is a desire to protect the suspected officials, cannot be considered effective. 
Article 15 prohibits the use of any statements made under torture as 
evidence in any proceedings. This provision recognises that a statement made 
under torture will often be unreliable and thus contrary to the principle of a fair 
trial.44 Preventing information gained through torture from being used in 
proceedings also removes a key impetus for employing torture in the first place. 
This is an indirect preventive measure. 
6 Remedial measures 
41 Ibid, 143. 
42 Ibid, 144. 
43 Ibid, 144-145. 
44 Ibid, 148. 
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Article 13 provides any person who claims to be the victim of torture or 
other ill treatment with a formal right of complaint and a right to have that 
complaint properly examined. It also requires States to take measures to ensure 
the complainant and any witnesses are protected from any ill treatment or 
intimidation as a consequence of the complaint. This provision recognises that 
often the alleged victim will be under some form of detention, and afraid of 
lodging a complaint since the complaint will likely be directed against someone 
involved in their custody, and could make the complainant vulnerable to further ill 
treatment. To ensure the alleged victim is able to exercise their right to complain, 
the State may have to take measures such as removing the complainant to another 
place of detention, changing the personnel responsible for the complainant's 
detention, or ensuring a witness is present during further interrogations.45 
Article 14 provides that a victim of torture shall be able to obtain redress 
and have an enforceable right to compensation, including the "means for as full 
rehabilitation as possible."46 
7 Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
In Article 16 States parties give a general undertaking to prevent acts of 
cruel , inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This corresponds to the 
basic obligation in Article 2 for States to take effective measures to prevent 
torture. However, only those obligations listed in Articles 10, 11 , 12 and 13 apply 
to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The 
Commission found it impossible to draft a precise definition of other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment when drafting the UNCAT. The 
vagueness of the concept thus made it unsuitable for those obligations of the 
UNCAT which would be reflected in the penal and procedural laws of the States 
· 47 parties. 
C The Committee Against Torture 
45 Ibid, 146. 
46 United Nations Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, above n 11 , art 14(1). 
47 Burgers and Danelius, above n 15, 149. 
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Article 17 of UNCAT sets up the Committee Against Torture ("CAT"), a 
panel of human rights experts who review periodic reports from States pa11ies and 
scrutinise the measures taken to give effect to the undertakings in UNCAT. CAT 
can also consider interstate and individual complaints against States parties.
48 
IV THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS 
A The Relevance of ICCPR Jurisprudence to NZ 
New Zealand has ratified the ICCPR, and incorporated it into New 
Zealand law, primarily through the Bill of Rights.
49 The Long Title of the Bill of 
Rights expressly provides that it is an "Act ... (b) To affirm New Zealand's 
commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." New 
Zealand has also ratified the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, allowing 
individuals the right to petition the Human Rights Committee ("the HRC"). 
The jurisprudence and commentary generated by the ICCPR is highly 
relevant for the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. The ICCPR was extensively 
drawn on by the drafters of the Bill of Rights.
50 In one of the first cases to 
interpret the Bill of Rights, the Court of Appeal noted that "[i]n approaching the 
Bill of Rights Act it must be of cardinal importance to bear in mind the 
antecedents."51 Subsequent cases have followed this approach.
52 
The language in section 9 of the Bill of Rights is almost identical to 
Article 7, and s23(5) resembles Article 10(1), which also indicates that the Bill of 
Rights was intended to follow ICCPR jurisprudence on this right. Thus, the 
48 See generally, N Radley above n 20, 152-161. 
49 This is not the only statute that implements the ICCPR into New Zealand law. For example, the 
Long Title of the Human Rights Act 1993 states that it is an Act to "provide better protection of 
human rights in New Zealand in general accordance with the United Nations Covenants or 
Conventions on Human Rights." 
50 Ministry of Justice "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper" [ 1984-85] I AJHR A 6, 
para 4.21-4.23. 
51 Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 270 (CA) Cooke P. 
52 For example, Zaoui v Attorney-Genera/ ( No 2) [2006] l NZLR 289, 3 J 8 (SC) Keith J for the 
Court. 
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incorporation of these obligations into the ICCPR rights provides strong support 
for such incorporation to occur within the Bill of Rights. 
While the jurisprudence from the ICCPR will be 'highly persuasive' in 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, it must be kept in mind that the New Zealand 
courts are not bound to follow the views of the HRC.53 
B The Human Rights Committee 
The HRC is the United Nations treaty body responsible for monitoring the 
ICCPR. It is made up of a panel of eighteen human rights experts who determine 
the meaning and effect of ICCPR provisions through making 'Observations' on 
periodic reports submitted by States parties; by issuing 'General Comments' on 
the scope and effect of the ICCPR rights; and by giving 'Views' on individual 
communications brought by persons claiming an inf1ingement of their rights.54 
C Obligations Read Into Article 7 
The HRC has identified numerous obligations within many of the articles 
in the ICCPR. These obligations have been justified by the mandate of article 2, 
which "requires that States Parties adopt legislative, judicial, administrative, 
educative and other appropriate measures in order to fulfil their legal 
obligations."55 Specifically, in relation to the prohibition of torture and other ill 
treatment, the HRC has recognised a number of different obligations upon States 
parties, including the duty to prosecute alleged to1turers, to establish certain 
preventive measures, and to refrain from extraditing, expelling or returning a 
person to face conduct in breach of Article 7. 
I Prosecution of alleged perpetrators 
53 R v Goodwin (No 2) [1993] 2 NZLR 390 (CA); Welli11gto11 District Legal Services Commiflee v 
Tangiora [ 1998] l NZLR 129 (CA). 
54 See generally, Joseph, Schultz and Castan The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Cases, Materials, and Co111111enrary (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) 16-21. 
55 Human Rights Committee "General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant", (26 May 2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add.13. 
See also, Joseph, Schultz and Castan, above n 54, 35. 
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The HRC has recognised an obligation under Article 7 to prosecute 
perpetrators of torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
56 
It has also 
condemned the grant of amnesties, specifically for acts of torture, as being 
incompatible with the duty of States to investigate such acts.
57 
2 Preventive ,neasures 
In the early communications where the HRC found breaches of Article 7, 
and Article 10(1), ill treatment was regularly found to have occu1Ted while the 
individual was being kept in detention.58 This coJTelation between the deprivation 
of liberty and the violation of human dignity, as well as concurrent drafting of 
UNCAT in the international community, prompted the HRC to give special 
attention to measures essential for preventing breaches of Article 7.
59 
It has since 
identified the following preventive obligations on States Parties: to promptly and 
impartially investigate complaints of a breach;
60 to provide mechanisms and 
procedures to prevent occuITences of torture, including systematic review of 
inteITogation rules, instructions, methods and practices;
61 
and to provide 
appropriate training and instruction to enforcement personnel, medical personnel, 
police officers and any other persons involved in the custody or treatment of any 
individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment.
62 
States are 
also under an obligation to prohibit the use or admissibility of statements obtained 
through torture or other ill treatment in judicial proceedings.
63 
56 Joseph, Schultz and Castan, above n 54, 266. 
57 Human Rights Committee "General Comment 20: Replaces general comment 7 concerning 
prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment (Art. 7)" (10 March 1992), para 15; 
Rodriguez v Uruguay Communication No. 322/1988 (19 July 1994) para 12.4. 
58 For example, Marais v. Madagascar Communication No. 49/1979, (1983); Muteba v. "Zaire, 
Communication No. 124/ 1982 (1984); Penarrieta et al. v. Bolivia, Communication No. 176/1984 
(1988). 
59 M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: a commentary (NP Engel Publisher, 
Strasbourg, 1993) 135-136. 
60 Nowak, above n 59, para 133-134; Concluding Observations on Peru , UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add. 67, (1996) para 10.5. 
61 Nowak, above n 59, para 11. For example, Herrera Rubio v Colombia, Communication No. 
161/1983 (1987) para 10.5. 
62 Ibid, para 10. 
63 Ibid , para 12 . 
17 
Unsurprisingly, these obligations closely resemble those in Articles 10, 11, 
12 and 13 of UNCAT. 64 The prohibition on the use of statements obtained through 
any Article 7 treatment in judicial proceedings is wider than the corresponding 
prohibition in Article 15, which only prohibits those statements obtained through 
torture. The HRC has also gone further than UNCAT, and read the following 
duties on States parties: to prohibit 'incommunicado' detention; to ensure routine 
visits by physicians, attorneys and family members; and to have a centralised 
registration system for all imprisoned persons. These duties help to prevent 
substantive breaches of the ICCPR, while also indicating the type of evidence 
which a State should adduce in order to refute allegations of torture or other ill 
treatment. 65 
However, the HRC has not yet found a breach of the ICCPR based solely 
on a breach of one of these preventive measures. Considering that only cases of 
extreme ill treatment have been found to breach Article 7, it seems highly unlikely 
that an omission of a preventive measure alone will suffice.66 
3 Expulsion, retum or extradition 
The HRC has read an obligation on States parties to not expel, return or 
extradite a person to a country where a violation of that person's Article 7 rights is 
a necessary and foreseeable consequence. 67 This provides a broader protection 
than Article 3 of UNCAT, which only applies to return to face acts of torture. 68 
D Differences between Obligations under UNCAT and Article 7 
64 M Nowak, above n 59, 136. 
65 Joseph, Schultz and Castan, above n 54, 255; M Nowak, above 59, 136; Hill and Hill v Spain, 
Communication No. 526/ 1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/526/ 1993 ( 1997). 
66 For example, see the cases cited in Ta11noa v Attorney-General (31 August 2007) SC 70, per 
Blanchard J para 166-168. 
67 For example, C v Australia Communication No 900/99, UN Doc CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999 
(2001); Judge v Canada Communication No 829/1998, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (2003); 
General Comment 20, para 9; Ng v Canada Communication No 469/91, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 ( 1993). 
68 BS v Canada, Communication No 166/00, UN Doc CAT/C/27/D/166/2000 (2001). 
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The HRC has declined to distinguish between the different categories of 
treatment in Article 7. 69 As such, many of the obligations read into this provision 
apply to all acts of ill treatment of any level of severity. As noted above, for 
example, States parties must refrain from exposing individuals to the danger of 
torture, as well as other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
upon return to another country through extradition, expulsion or refoulement.
70 
This is broader than UNCAT, which provides fewer protections against cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
The HRC has also extended the obligation on States parties under Article 7 
to protect individuals against infringement of their rights by private parties:
71 
It is the duty of the State party to afford everyone protection through legislative 
and other measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article 7, 
whether inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside their official 
capacity or in a private capacity. 
This also goes beyond UNCAT, which limits its protections to acts which 
have some degree of State involvement. 
V THE PROTECTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER ILL 
TREATMENT IN NEW ZEALAND 
A The Statutory Framework 
I The Crimes of Torture Act 1989 
The Crimes of Torture Act 1989 ("the Torture Act") serves two purposes: 
to enable New Zealand to meet its international obligations under both UNCAT 
and the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel , 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 2002 (the Optional Protocol). 
69 Human Rights Committee, above n 57, para 2. 
70 Human Rights Committee, above n 57, para 9; Joseph , Schultz and Castan, above n 54,231. 
71 Joseph, Schultz and Castan, above n 54, para 2. 
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Part one of the Torture Act addresses New Zealand's obligations under 
UNCA T. It criminalises acts of torture. The definition of 'torture' in the Torture 
Act follows the UNCAT definition, with some discernable differences. For 
example, the Torture Act definition omits any reference to 'public officials.'72 The 
section which criminalises torture, however, only applies to public officials or 
those acting in a public capacity.73 Also, the definition adds a qualifying reference 
to the ICCPR: torture does not include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions but only to the extent that those 
sanctions are not inconsistent with the Articles of the ICCPR.74 
Section 4 of the Act recognises jurisdiction on the basis of territoriality 
and the nationality of the offender but does not go so far as to recognise 
jurisdiction based on the nationality of the victim of torture.75 Section 8 fulfils the 
obligation on States parties to include the offence of torture in any present and 
future extradition treaties. 
The obligations regarding extradition, expulsion or refoulment to face 
torture, and to establish preventive and remedial measures are omitted. The 
exclusion of these obligations appears to be due to a number of factors . Firstl y, 
New Zealand entered a reservation at the time of signing UNCAT, reserving the 
right to award compensation to torture victims as referred to in Article 14 only at 
the discretion of the Attorney-General of New Zealand. Secondly, the bill to 
implement New Zealand's commitment to UNCAT was introduced as part of an 
omnibus Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill in 1987. This Bill 
contained over a hundred clauses, concerning at least fifty different statutes. As is 
apparent from Hansard, the implementation of UNCAT did not receive any 
meaningful attention from Parliament. The omission of certain obligations could 
thus easily be an oversight. However, the more likely explanation is that the 
government did not consider these extra obligations to be necessary in New 
Zealand. The attitude of the government towards UNCAT is summed up by the 
then Minister of Justice in hi s justification for enacting this statute: 76 
72 Crimes of Torture Act 1989, s2. 
73 Ibid , s3(3). 
74 Ibid , s3(3). 
75 Ibid , s 4. 
76 
( 13 December 1988) NZPD 8932. 
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In introducing [the provisions of the Torture Act] the Government by no means 
is suggesting that torture is a problem in New Zealand. However, it is a problem 
in other parts of the world . The convention was designed to bring pressure to 
bear on those countries that use torture as an instrument of State policy. 
It is apparent that the Government believed that criminalising torture, and 
enabling universal jurisdiction over that offence was sufficient to meet its 
obligations under UNCA T. Perhaps, impliedly, the government considered it had 
fulfilled the omitted obligations through other mechanisms and thus did not need 
to spell them out in the Torture Act. 
Part two of the Torture Act enables New Zealand to meet its international 
obligations under the Optional Protocol. The Optional Protocol was adopted by 
the General Assembly on 18 December 2002 and entered into force on 22 June 
2006.77 It is a system of preventive measures designed to strengthen the protection 
of persons deprived of their liberty against torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.78 The Optional Protocol provides for a system 
of regular visits and recommendations by independent international and national 
bodies to places where people are deprived of their liberty. 
The Torture Act enables the mandate of the international Subcommittee on 
the Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment of the Committee against Torture ("the Subcommittee") to be 
fulfilled, by granting it access to and information about New Zealand's detention 
centres, and all persons detained.79 It also sets up National Preventive 
Mechanisms, domestic counterpa1ts to the Subcommittee, as required by Article 3 
of the Optional Protocol. 80 The Minister of Justice has designated the 
Ombudsmen, the Police Complaints Authority, the Children's Commissioner and 
77 UNGA "Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment" (18 December 2002) NRES/57/199. 
78 Ibid , preamble. 
79 Crimes of Torture Act 1989, ss 18-20. 
80 Ibid , SS 26-30. 
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Visiting Officers appointed in accordance with the relevant Defence Force Orders, 
as National Preventive Mechanisms. 81 
The National Preventive Mechanisms are required to visit 'places of 
detention' at regular intervals to examine the conditions of detention, and make 
recommendations for improving the conditions as well as for preventing torture or 
other ill treatment. 82 They are required to report to the Government on their 
findings. 83 The Subcommittee, which also has unrestricted access to inspect 
places of detention, is required to provide advice and assistance to the National 
Preventive Mechani sms. 84 
New Zealand's ratification of the Optional Protocol goes some way in 
rectifying the omission of the preventive measures of UNCAT in the Torture Act. 
However, the National Preventive Mechanisms and the Subcommittee have 
recommendatory powers only, and it is too soon to tell how effective these 
measures will be in practice. 
2 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Sections 9 and 23(5) provide everyone the right to be free from torture and 
other ill treatment. The White Paper defines section 9 as being "aimed at any form 
of treatment or punishment which is incompatible with the dignity and worth of 
the human person."85 It points to the Bill of Rights 1689 as the origin of this 
protection. 
Understanding the scope of section 9 can be aided by considering the other 
rights protected under the heading 'secuiity of the person ' in the Bill of Rights : 
the right not to be deprived of life,86 the 1ight not to be subjected to medical or 
81 Mark Burton "Designation of National Preventi ve Mechanisms" (2 1 June 2007) New Zealand 
Gazette Wellington 18 16. 
82 Crimes of Torture Act, 1989, s 27. Section 16 prov ides a non-exclusive li st of places of 
detention. 
83 Ibid , s 27 (c). 
84 Optional Protocol to the Convention aga inst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Puni shment, above n 77, art 11. 
85 Ministry o f Justice, abo ve n 50, para 10.162. 
86 New Zealand Bill of Ri ghts Act 1990, s 8. 
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scientific experimentation87 and the right to refuse to undergo medical treatment.
88 
These 1ights all seem to be aimed at securing physical bodily integrity, which 
includes mental and psychological integrity. 
Section 23(5) protects the particular right of persons deprived of liberty to 
be treated with humanity and respect for their inherent dignity, which suggests 
that section 9 is aimed at more serious conduct which results in physical or 
psychological harm. 8
9 
B The Case Law 
1 Zaoui 
The Supreme Court in Zaoui v Attorney General (No 2) ('Zaoui') relied on 
international jurisprudence to inform the scope of section 9. 
90 Mr Zaoui, who had 
been classified as a refugee, was the first person to be the subject of a security risk 
certificate under Part 4A of the Immigration Act 1987. This statutory scheme 
enabled the Government to rely on certain classified security information and 
deport a person who was considered a threat or danger to the secu1ity of New 
Zealand. 91 The broad issue before the Supreme Coutt was to what extent the 
Executive had to take into account the risk that Mr Zaoui 's human rights would be 
violated if he were deported from New Zealand. 
Counsel for Mr Zaoui argued that the State's powers to deport him had to 
be consistent with the non-refoulement provision in Article 3 of UNCAT, or any 
comparable international law or Bill of Rights standard.
92 The basis for this 
argument was the reference to Article 33.2 of the Refugee Convention in the 
87 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 10. 
88 Ibid , s 11. 
89 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler, above n 12,225. See also, comments in Taunoa v Attorney-
General (3 1 August 2007) SC 70, per Blanchard 176-177; Tipping J para 285; McGrath J para 
339. 
90 'Zaoui v Attorney-General ( No 2), above n 3, 318-321 Keith J for the Court. 
91 For a thorough description of the statutory framework, see C Geiringer "International law 
through the lens ofZaoui: Where is New Zealand at?" (2006) 17 PLR 300, 302-309. 
92 'Zaoui v Attorney General ( No 2) above n 3, 299 Keith J for the Court. 
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Immigration Act 1987 as a 'relevant security criteria' upon which a security risk 
certificate could be issued.93 
The Supreme Court ultimately found that these human rights concerns did 
not have to be considered at the stage of issuing a security risk certificate.94 
However the Government was still under an obligation to act in conformity with 
New Zealand's obligations under the ICCPR and UNCAT to protect Mr Zaoui 
from return to threats of torture or the arbitrary taking of life, as accepted by the 
Solicitor-General. 95 This acceptance distinguishes the position of the New 
Zealand government from that espoused by the Canadian Supreme Court that 
obligations in respect of torture are not absolute, especially in the face of a 
. I . h 96 nat10na secunty t reat. 
The issue before the Court was in which way these obligations were to be 
met under New Zealand law. The Supreme Court turned to sections 8 and 9 of the 
Bill of Rights as providing a possible answer, and held that: 97 
These provisions do not expressly apply to actions taken outside New Zealand 
by other governments in breach of the rights stated in the Bill of Rights . This is 
also the case with articles 6(1) and 7 of the ICCPR. But those and comparable 
provisions have long been understood as applying to actions of a state party -
here New Zealand - if that state proposes to take action, say by way of 
deportation or extradition, where substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that the person as a consequence faces a real risk of being subjected to 
torture or the arbitrary taking of life. 
Thus, relying on numerous international cases, the Supreme Court read an 
implied non-refoulement obligation into the Bill of Rights.98 The Court went on to 
93 Article 33.2 allows the refoulement of a refugee who is found, on reasonable grounds, to 
constitute a danger to the community. 
94 Zaoui v Attorney General (No 2) above n 3, 317-318 Keith J for the Court. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Suresh v Ca11ada ( Minister of Citize11ship and /111migration ) [2002] l SCR 3. 
97 Zaoui v Attorney General ( No 2) above n 3, 318-319 Keith J for the Court. 
98 S0eri11g v United Ki11gdo111 (1989) ll EHRR 439 (ECtHR) paras 90 and 91; Kindler v Canada 
(1993) CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991, paras l3.l-13.2; R(Ulla) v Special Adjudicator [2003] l WLR 
(CA); Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413 paras 73-82. 
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invoke the presumption of consistency to hold that the power to deport Mr Zaoui 
had to be exercised consistently with this obligation:
99 
As directed by s 6 of the Bill of Rights, s 72 is to be given a meaning, if it can, 
consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in it, including the right not to 
be arbitrarily deprived of life and not to be subjected to torture. Those rights in 
turn are to be interpreted and the powers conferred bys 72 are to be exercised, if 
the wording will permit, so as to be in accordance with international law, both 
customary and treaty based. 
2 Taunoa 
Attorney-General v Taunoa ('Taunoa') is also known as the 'prisoner 
compensation case,' where several inmates were compensated for breaches of 
section 9 and section 23(5) of the Bill of Rights.
100 The claim was based on the 
use of the Behavioural Management Regime ("the BMR") and administrative 
segregation by the Department of Corrections to help control the behaviour of 
maximum security prisoners at Auckland Prison. 10
1 The High Cou11 found aspects 
of BMR were contrary to the Penal Institutions Act 1954 (PIA) and the Penal 
Institutions 2000 (Regulations), and breached section 23(5).
102 
The breaches of section 23(5) where attributable to several factors, 
including: lengthy unlawful segregation from other inmates; loss of ordinary 
inmate 'entitlements' while on segregation; cell hygiene, bedding, clothing falling 
below standards established by prison regulations; inadequate monitoring of 
inmate mental health; inadequate exercise conditions; and unlawful strip searches. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal confirmed the finding of section 23(5) breach in 
respect of all the claimants, and further held there was a breach of section 9 in 
relation to a Mr Tofts, who had pre-existing psychiatric difficulties and should not 
have been placed on BMR. 103 
99 'Zaoui v Attorney General (No 2) above n 3, 321 Keith J for the Court. 
'
00 Attorney General v Taunoa (2004) 7 HRNZ 379 (HC) Ronald Young J. 
101 See the High Court judgement for a detailed description of the regime. 
102 Taunoa v Attorney-General, above n 100, para 276 Ronald Young J (the liability judgement) . 
The Penal Institutions Act 1954 has si nee been repealed and replaced by the Corrections Act 2004. 
'
03 Attorney-General v Tawzoa [2006) 2 NZLR 457 , 487-489 (CA) O'Regan JJ for the Court 
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The case was further appealed and cross-appealed to the Supreme 
Court. 104 The inmates appealed against the rejection of their claim that placement 
on BMR amounted to a breach of section 9. The Attorney-General cross-appealed 
on the issue of appropriate remedies. 105 By a majority, the Supreme Court upheld 
the Court of Appeal's decision and declined to find a breach of section 9 for any 
of the inmates. 
The trilogy of Taunoa cases thus raised a number of issues concerning the 
scope and application of sections 9 and 23(5). The most significant, for the 
purposes of this paper, is the treatment of New Zealand's international obligations 
relevant to the interpretation of sections 9 and 23(5). 
In the High Court, Ronald Young J looked to the statutory definition of 
t011ure in the Torture Act, and the definition in Article 1 of UNCAT, in order to 
identify the elements of torture under section 9. 106 He followed the definition as 
stated in UNCAT, but added an extra element: that "the acts are unjustifiable in 
the particular circumstances." 107 This final element seems contrary to the standing 
of torture as an 'absolute' right in the international jurisprudence. 108 Justifiability 
was not in issue, however, and the point was not appealed. 
Ronald Young J also held that the complaints made under the Standard 
Minimum Rules of Prisoners, the Bill of Rights 1688, the ICCPR and UNCAT 
were 'mirrored' in the complaints of breaches of the PIA, the regulations and the 
Bill of Rights, and thus did not need to be considered separately. 109 Specifically in 
relation to the ICCPR and UNCAT, the Judge considered that: 110 
104 Taunoa v Attorney-General (31 August 2007) NZSC SC 6/2006. 
105 An exploration of the issues of appropriate remedies for a breach of section 9 or section 23(5) 
of the Bi II of Rights is outside the scope of this paper. 
106 Taunoa v Attorney-Genera/, above n 100, para 256-259 Ronald Young J (the liability 
judgement). 
107 Ibid, para [259] 
108 See for example, United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, above n 11, art 2; Clayton and Tomlinson. The Law of 
H11111an Rights: Volume 1 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 388 citing Chahal v UK (1996) 
23 EHRR 413 . 
109 Taunoa v Attorney-General, above n 100, para 280 Ronald Young J (the liability judgement). 
110 Ibid , para 282. 
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the relevant provisions of the ICCPR and the Torture Convention have been 
incorporated into New Zealand legislation . Sections 9 and s23(5) of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act cover in very similar ways these covenants and 
conventions as well as other international laws of conduct in relation to the 
treatment of prisoners. 
On appeal, the claimants argued Ronald Young J had erred in concluding 
that the ICCPR and UNCAT were pait of New Zealand law, and then failing to 
consider the international jurisprudence. The Court of Appeal, however, held that 
the respondent's had misinterpreted Ronald Young J because: 111 
that is not what the Judge said. What he said was that the provisions of the 
ICCPR and the Convention against Torture had been incorporated into New 
Zealand legislation, particularly ss 9 and 23(5) of the Bill of Rights . We agree 
with the Judge·s conclusion in that regard. 
Certain provisions of the ICCPR and UNCAT are thus incorporated into 
New Zealand law through the Bill of Rights. The courts did not further elaborate 
on which provisions exactly; however considering the claim was about the 
humane treatment of prisoners, the provisions of the ICCPR and UNCAT relating 
to the treatment of prisoners are likely to be the most relevant. 
The inmates also attempted to claim that the Court should order an 
investigation into BMR and the circumstances of its imposition. Specifically, they 
claimed that they had a right to a prompt and impartial investigation under Article 
12 of UNCAT. However, Ronald Young J refused to allow the claimants to file a 
late amended statement of claim on the opening day of the High Court trial, as it 
was too late. That decision was upheld on both appeals and, as a result, the Court 
did not consider whether the State was under an obligation to investigate 
allegations of torture or ill treatment under the Bill of Rights.' 12 Counsel for the 
inmates subsequently filed a new claim for these obligations in Clark, discussed 
below. 
111 Attorney-General v Taunoa [2006] 2 NZLR 457, 509 (CA) O'Regan for the Court. 
11 2 But see Taunoa v Attorney-General (3 l August 2007) NZSC SC 6/2006, para [228] Blanchard 
J indicating that, if the Government were considering to act on a recommendation to investigate 
further from the Committee Against Torture, a Court order to investigate may not be necessary. 
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3 Clark 
The claimant in Clark v Governor - General & Ors' 13 sought to bring a 
claim against the State for breaching its obligations under Articles 10, 11, 12 and 
13 of UNCAT. The Attorney-General successfully applied to have this part of the 
claim struck out. As it is directly on point, it bears setting out the details of the 
decision in full. 
(a) The facts 
The plaintiff, Wayne Clark, was an inmate in D Block at Auckland Prison 
where he claimed he was assaulted by prison officers. He sought an enquiry into 
the incident under section 10 of the PIA. 114 Justice Doogue interviewed the 
plaintiff pursuant to section 10 of the PIA, and advised the Chief District Court 
Judge that the complaints could not be adequately dealt with under the PIA, as 
they alleged serious criminal offending. The Chief District Comt Judge advised 
the plaintiff's counsel that the Office of the Ombudsman would be prepared to 
investigate matter. Counsel rejected the offer because, in his view, the 
Ombudsman did not have sufficient investigatory powers to properly investigate 
the matter. 
The Chief District Court Judge subsequently advised the plaintiff that he 
was not prepared to accede to the request for a formal investigation, for three 
reasons: firstly, alternative mechanisms involving other parties, such as the Police, 
the Prison Inspectorate and the Ombudsman, were available; secondly, there were 
no clear legislative guidelines governing how such an investigation was to be 
undertaken; and thirdly, any agreement to the request could open door for large 
numbers of similar requests. 115 
(b) The claim 
11 3 (27 May 2005) HC WN CIY-2004-485-001902. 
114 The Penal Institutions Act 1954 was repealed and replaced by the Corrections Act 2004. 
Section 19 of the Corrections Act is largely similar to section l O of the PIA. 
11 5 Clark v Governor - General & Ors (27 May 2005) HC WN CIV-2004-485-001902, para 12, 
Associate Judge Gendall. 
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The plaintiff was dissatisfied with the outcome of this process, and 
instituted proceedings against the Crown seeking, first , judicial review of the 
decision to decline to further investigate the incident, and secondly, a declaration 
that the failings of the Government to provide for and/or fund education, review , 
investigation and protection of complainants in respect of torture and ill treatment 
constituted breaches of the Bill of Rights, specifically sections 9 and 23(5).
116 
(c) The submissions 
The defendants applied for the second part of the plaintiff's claim to be 
struck out. They submitted that obligations of education, review, investigation 
and protection of complainants are not part of the rights incorporated into New 
Zealand Jaw by the Bill of Rights. While acknowledging that these measures can 
help systematically with the prevention and punishment of acts breaching the Bill 
of Rights , they argued that neither sections 9 and 23(5) , expressly or impliedly, 
impose those obligations on the Government. It was also pointed out that the 
plaintiff cannot rely directly on international law obligations to found domestic 
causes of action. 11 7 
The plaintiff relied on the jurisprudence of European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), where obligations to investigate and protect complainants have 
been implied into Article 3 despite the ECHR not containing provisions expressly 
outlining such obligations. 11 8 In reply to the argument against international 
obligations founding domestic causes of action , the plaintiff submitted that a 
number of cases supported the contention that unincorporated human rights 
instruments can provide the basis of claims in domestic courts, and pointed to 
Baigent 's Case as an example.119 
The plaintiff also submitted that the Government must have intended the 
Bill of Rights to provide a domestic remedy to those whose rights were 
116Ibid , para 13 Associate Judge Gendall. 
11 7 Ibid , para 15 - 17 Associate Judge Gendall. 
11 8 Krastanov v Bulgaria [2004] ECHR 50222/99. 
11 9 Simpson & A nor v Attorney-General ( Baigent's Case) [ 1994] 3 NZLR 667 , 676 (CA) Cooke P. 
In thi s case, a majority of the Court relied on Article 2(3) of the ICCPR to grant a remedy. 
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violated. 120 If the Court refused to read these international obligations into NZ 
law, the plaintiff would have no domestic remedy and be forced to complain 
directly to the Human Rights Committee. 
(d) The decision 
Associate Judge Gendall found "considerable force" in the arguments 
against the Bill of Rights incorporating these obligations. He found it significant 
that section 9, which was enacted after UNCAT, contains no reference to Articles 
10, 11, 12 or 13. Similarly, the Torture Act was enacted specifically to implement 
UNCAT, and also lacks any reference to these particular obligations. The Judge 
considered both of these to be indicative of Parliamentary intention "to retain the 
discretion as to the further implementation of the Convention and ICCPR." 121 He 
also found that the existing mechanisms for investigating prisoner's claims of 
abuse established under the PIA suggest that the courts should not read these 
obligations into the Bill of Rights, since reading in these wider obligations would 
"require considerable interference in an area that is cuJTently governed by 
statute." 122 
Associate Judge Gendall then turned to the arguments in support of these 
obligations being incorporated into domestic law. First, he recognised " the 
fundamental nature of the right against torture and ill treatment, and the 
coJTesponding need to place obligations on the Government to investigate and 
prevent such abuses ." 123 Second, he recognised that " legislative incorporation of 
rights must imply an incorporation of effective remedies ." 124 The ICCPR also 
expressly requires States to ensure remedies are available for violations of 
1ights. 125 Third, he noted that incorporation of these obligations into the Bill of 
Rights would not be "unprecedented" - the ECtHR has read them into article 3 of 
IZO Ibid . 
12 1 Clark v Governor - General & Ors (27 May 2005) HC WN CIV-2004-485-001902, pa ra 50, 
Associate Judge Gendall . 
122 Ibid . 
123 Ibid , para 5 l. 
124 Ibid , para 52 relying on Baigent 's Case. 
125 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 6, art 2(3). 
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the ECHR. 
126 However, he noted that this precedent is of limited
 value, 
considering the "different constitutional basis" of the ECtH
R from New Zealand's 
domestic courts. Interestingly, he does not consider the pos
ition under the ICCPR. 
As stated above, the HRC has read similar obligations into 
Article 7. 
Associate Judge Gendall ultimately decides that for 
the plaintiff to 
succeed, it must be shown that these obligations are of 
the "right nature to be 
incorporated into law."
127 He distinguishes between those obligations that are 
applicable to specific disputes and thus justiciable, and tho
se that are political and 
require executive action, and are consequently non-justici
able. He considers two 
of the claimed obligations to be non-justiciable: issues o
f funding and training 
officials and of systematically reviewing procedures relat
ing to inten-ogation of 
prisoners would be too political for the courts to decide: th
e "court process is not 
well-suited to the type of analysis necessary."
128 
Associate Judge Gendall found the other two obligations,
 that of prompt 
and impartial investigation, and protection of complainan
ts and witnesses, to be 
justiciable, because without them "rights against torture a
nd ill treatment will be 
empty."
129 However, he held that it was unnecessary to decide wh
ether these 
obligations are incorporated into the Bill of Rights becaus
e the Government had 
not breached them: the statutory mechanisms available "il
lustrate that a statutory 
regime is in place for the investigation of complaints of tort
ure or ill treatment."
130 
The end result, then, is a tentative finding that the oblig
ations found in 
Article 12 and Article 13 of UNCAT could be incorporated
 into the Bill of Rights. 
C Summary 
Zaoui1 Taunoa and Clark each address the
 incorporation of international 
obligations into New Zealand law through the Bill of Righ
ts. All three cases rely 
126 Clark v Governor - General & Ors (27 May 2005) HC WN C
IV-2004-485-001902, para 53, 
Associate Judge Gendall. 
127 Ibid , para 57. 
128 Ibid , para 61. 
129 Ibid, para 63. 
130 Ibid , para 76. 
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extensively on international jurisprudence when interpreting the scope of sections 
9 and 23(5), particularly from UNCAT and the ICCPR. The Bill of Rights has 
thus been read to imply an obligation of non-refoulement; to incorporate certain 
obligations relating to the treatment of prisoners into New Zealand Jaw; and, 
albeit tentatively, to incorporate an obligation to provide a right of complaint and 
a duty to investigate allegations of torture or ill treatment. 
Under UNCA T and the ICCPR, there are a number of other obligations 
relating to the effective protection of torture and ill treatment. To what extent can 
these other obligations be read into section 9? Clark identifies at least two 
difficulties with reading these obligations into section 9. First, there is limited 
legislative incorporation of these obligations, indicating that Parliament did not 
intend to implement these obligations in domestic law. Secondly, the nature of 
many of the other obligations under UNCA T require policy decisions. As such, 
they are beyond the competence of the courts. Another hurdle preventing the 
incorporation of these obligations through the Bill of Rights is that they require 
the State to undertake a number of positive obligations, which may be 
incompatible with the 'process theory' of rights protected by the Bill of Rights. 
Each of these issues is considered below, after a brief investigation of how 
other courts in other jurisdictions have addressed this issue. 
VI COMPARISON WITH OVERSEAS JURISDICTIONS 
A The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
Article 3 of the ECHR provides a broad, general protection against torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: "No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Unlike most of the 
substantive rights clauses in the ECHR, Article 3 has no provision for exceptions 
and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15, even in the event of a 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation. The European Court of 
Human Rights (the ECtHR) has stated on many occasions that this reflects the 
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place of Article 3 as enshrining one of the fundamental values of democratic 
society. 131 New Zealand courts have noted that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR as 
relevant when interpreting analogous provisions in the Bill of Rights.
132 
The 
jurisprudence from the ECtHR, while compelling, is less persuasive when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
The ECtHR has read an extensive number of duties on States, under the 
ECHR. It has justified doing so by reference to the obligation in Article 1 on 
States parties to "secure" the rights provided for in the ECHR to their citizens, 
along with the obligation in Article 13 to provide effective remedies: "the 
emphasis is on the "effective" protection of human rights, not the entrenchment of 
"theoretical" or "illusory" rights"
133 The ECtHR has read a number of duties into 
Article 3, including the duty to investigate allegations of a breach of Article 3,
134 
the duty to not return an individual to a place which will breach their Article 3 
rights 135 and a duty to ensure private persons do not breach Article 3 in their 
treatment of others. 1
36 
1 Duty to investigate 
Aksoy v Turkey 137 was the first case in which the Court identified an 
investigative element in Article 3. In this case, the applicant was aJTested and 
detained for two weeks on suspicion of belonging to the Workers Party of 
Kurdistan. He claimed the police had tortured him during his detention, and ten 
days after his release he was admitted to hospital, where he was diagnosed as 
suffering from nerve damage in both arms causing paralysis. The applicant had 
131 Aksoy v Turkey (1997) 23 EHRR 553 para 62 (ECHR); Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) 2 
EHRR 25 para. 163 (ECHR); Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439 para. 88 (ECHR); 
Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413 para. 79 (ECHR). 
132 For example, Tavita [1994] 2 NZLR 257,262 (CA) Cooke P. 
133 Keir Starmer, "Positive Obligations under the Convention" in Jowell, J and Cooper, J (eds) 
Understanding Human Rights Principles (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2001) 145; For example, see 
Ilhan v Turkey (2002) 9 EHRR 203, para 91. 
134 Balogh v Hungary [2004] ECHR 47940/99 Para 47; Selmouni v France (2000) 29 EHRR 403, 
para 87. 
135 Soering v United Kingdom, above n 131; Chahal v United Kingdom, above n 131. 
136 A v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 611 (ECHR); Zand others v United Kingdom (2001) 10 
BHRC 384 (ECHR). 
137 Aksoy v Turkey, above n 131. 
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been healthy before the detention, and there was no other explanation for his 
mJunes. 
The Court found that the applicant's injuries had been caused by torture, 
thus there had been a violation of Article 3. The Court further held that: 138 
[w]here an individual is taken into police custody in good health but is found to 
be injured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a 
plausible explanation as to the causing of the injury, failing which a clear issue 
arises under Article 3 of the Convention. 
The Court held that the lack of an investigation into the applicant's claim 
of torture breached Article 13 - the right to an effective remedy before a national 
authority: 139 
The nature of the right safeguarded under Article 3 of the Convention has 
implications for Article 13. Given the fundamental importance of the 
prohibition of torture ... and the especially vulnerable position of torture 
victims, Article 13 imposes, without prejudice to any other remedy available 
under the domestic system, an obligation on States to carry out a thorough and 
effective investigation of incidents of torture. Accordingly, as regards Article 
13, where an individual has an arguable claim that he has been tortured by 
agents of the State, the notion of an "effective remedy" entails, in addition to the 
payment of compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective 
investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those 
responsible and including effective access for the complainant to the 
investigatory procedure. It is true that no express provision exists in the 
Convention such as can be found in Article 12 of the 1984 United Nations 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel , Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, which imposes a duty to proceed to a "prompt and impartial" 
investigation whenever there is a reasonable ground to believe that an act of 
torture has been committed. However, in the Court's view, such a requirement is 
implicit in the notion of an "effective remedy" under Article 13. 
Thus in Aksoy, while the Court recognised the importance of investigating 
allegations of torture, the duty fell under Article 13, rather than Article 3. In 
138 Aksoy v Turkey, above n 131 , para 61. 
139 Ibid, para 98. 
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Assenov and Others v Bulgaria
140 the Court went further and recognised an 
obligation for the State to investigate allegations of torture not only un
der Article 
13 but also under Article 3. In Assenov, it was unclear whether the applic
ant had 
been subjected to treatment prohibited by Article 3. The Court conclu
ded that a 
violation of Article 3 had occun-ed, not from ill treatment per se but fro
m a failure 
to cany out an effective official investigation on the allegation of ill trea
tment: 
141 
The Court considers that, in these circumstances, where an individual 
raises an 
arguable claim that he has been seriously ill-treated by the police or ot
her such 
agents of the State unlawfully and in breach of Article 3, that provision
, read in 
conjunction with the State's general duty under Article l of the Conven
tion to 
"secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms def
ined in . 
. . [the] Convention", requires by implication that there should be an 
effective 
official investigation. This investigation, as with that under Article 2, s
hould be 
capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those respon
sible ... 
If this were not the case, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhu
man 
and degrading treatment and punishment, despite its fundamental im
portance 
(see para 93 above), would be ineffective in practice and it would be po
ssible in 
some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those wit
hin their 
control with virtual impunity. 
The Court also reiterated its position in the Aksoy case and concluded there
 
had also been a violation of Article 13.
142 
The obligation to investigate allegations of torture has also been found
 to 
have been breached where the investigation carried out by the State 
was not a 
thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identifi
cation and 
punishment of those responsible for the acts of ill treatment.
143 
2 Extradition 
140 (1999) 28 ElIRR 652 (ECHR). 
141 Assenov and others v Bulgaria (1999) 28 EI-IRR 652, para 102 (ECHR). 
142 Ibid, para 117. See also Ilhan v Turkey [2000] App 22277 /93 para 89-92 (
ECHR); Khashiyev 
and another v Russia [2005] App 57942/00 para 177-180 (ECHR). 
143 Selmouni v France above n 134, para 79. 
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State decisions to extradite which expose individuals to the risk of conduct 
prohibited under Article 3 have been held to give rise to a breach of Article 3. 144 
This rule was laid down in the landmark decision of Soering v United Kingdom. 145 
The applicant in this case was a German national, who was detained in England 
pending extradition to the United States of America to face charges of murder in 
Virginia. If convicted there, he faced the risk of being sentenced to death. 
The issue confronting the ECtHR was whether the United Kingdom could 
be held responsible under the ECHR when the proscribed ill treatment would be 
administered in the United States of America. In answering this in the affirmative, 
the Court made a global assessment of the need to provide effective protection of 
the rights under the ECHR. 
It noted that while the ECHR does not protect a right not to be extradited, 
if the enjoyment of a protected right is adversely affected as a result of that 
extradition, the responsibility of the extraditing States is engaged. Other 
instruments, such as extradition treaties, which expressly allow for extradition 
"cannot absolve the Contracting Parties from responsibility under Article 3 for all 
and any foreseeable consequences of extradition suffered outside their 
jurisdiction." 146 
The Court then considered the absolute and fundamental nature of the 
prohibition in Article 3. It identified that the abhon-ence of torture and other ill 
treatment is recognised in Article 3 of UNCAT as sufficient to engage State 
responsibility for actions committed by another State. The ECtHR pointed out that 
the explicit recognition of this obligation in UNCAT does not preclude such an 
obligation being read into Article 3 of the ECHR: 147 
The fact that a speciali sed treaty should spell out in detail a specific obligati on 
attaching to the prohibition of torture does not mean that an essenti a ll y similar 
obligati on is not a lready inherent in the general terms of article 3 of the ECHR. 
144 Keir Starmer European Human Rights Law: The Human Rights Act 1998 and the European 
Con vention on Hu111a11 Rig Ills (Legal Action Gro up London 1999) 506. Ahmed v Austria (1997) 24 
EHRR 278, para 39, (ECHR). 
145 (1989) 11 EHRR 439. 
146 S0eri11g v United Kingdom, above n 131 , para 86. 
147 Ibid , para 88 . 
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It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, 
that "common heritage of political traditions , ideals , freedom and the rule of 
law" to which the Preamble refers, were a Contracting State knowingly to 
surrender a fugitive to another State where there were substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture, however 
heinous the crime allegedly committed. Extradition in such circumstances , while 
not explicitly referred to in the brief and general wording of Article 3, would 
plainly be contrary to the spirit and intendment of the Article, and in the Court's 
view this inherent obligation not to extradite also extends to cases in which the 
fugitive would be faced in the receiving State by a real ri sk of exposure to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment proscribed by that Article 
Thus the ECtHR held that the decision of a State party to extradite a 
fugitive may engage its responsibility under Article 3 where substantial grounds 
have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a 
real 1isk of being subjected to t01ture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in the requesting country.
148 
On the facts, the ECtHR held that the risk of Mr Soering being sentenced 
to death and thus being exposed to the "death row phenomenon" were substantial. 
These circumstances, when taken together with the average six to eight years a 
prisoners spend on death row prior to execution, the stringency of the conditions 
while on death row, the applicant ' s young age and mental health condition , and 
the fact that extradition to face trial in Germany was an available alternative, led 
the ECtHR to find that extradition to the United States of America would expose 
the applicant to treatment beyond the threshold set by Article 3. 
The Soering approach was subsequently upheld by the Court, even in the 
face of a national security threat. In Chahal v United Kingdom , 
149 the applicant 
faced deportation to India by the United Kingdom government on grounds of 
national security and the international fight against tetTorism. Chahal alleged, inter 
alia, that his deportation was contrary to his Article 3 right. 
148 Ibid , para 91 . 
149 (1996) 23 EHRR 413 . 
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The United Kingdom government argued that the risk Mr Chahal posed to 
national security was an implied limitation in Article 3, which provided grounds 
entitling the State to expel him. Alternatively, the United Kingdom argued that the 
risk to national security was a factor to be weighed in the balance when 
considering issues under Article 3. Where, as here, the risk of ill treatment was 
doubtful, the threat to national security weighed heavily in the balance struck 
between protecting the rights of the individual and the general interests of the 
community. Thus, the United Kingdom government argued, it was justified m 
deporting Mr Chahal. 150 
The Court disagreed and reaffirmed the fundamental and absolute nature 
of the prohibition in Article 3: 151 
The Court is well aware of the immense difficulty faced by states in modern times 
in protecting their communities from terrorist violence. However, even in these 
circumstances, the [ECHR] prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim 's conduct ... The 
prohibition provided by art 3 against ill-treatment is equally absolute in expulsion 
cases. 
3 Duty to establish protective measures to safeguard certain individuals 
from serious ill treatment by private parties 
In A v United Kingdom the Court found Article 3 required States to take 
measures designed that individuals within their jmisdiction are not subjected to 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
The applicant in this case was a nine year old boy who had been beaten 
several times with a garden cane by his stepfather. Under English law, it was a 
defence to a charge of assault on a child that the treatment in question amounted 
to ' reasonable chastisement'. As such, the stepfather was found not guilty of 
assault. 
15° Chahal v United Kingdom, above n 131 , para 76. 
151 Ibid , para 79-80. 
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The ECtHR held that the beating meted out on the applicant was of 
sufficient severity to meet the threshold of prohibited treatment under article 3.
152 
It also held that the State ought to be held responsible for the conduct of the 
stepfather: 
153 
[T]he obligation on the high contracting parties under art l of the convention to 
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
the convention, taken together with art 3, requires states to take measures 
designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including such ill-
treatment administered by private individuals ... Children and other vulnerable 
individuals, in particular, are entitled to state protection, in the form of effective 
deterrence, against such serious breaches of personal integrity. 
Here, the failure of the English law to provide adequate protection to the 
applicant against treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3 constituted a 
breach of Article 3. 
This decision was reaffirmed in the later case of Z and Others v Un;ted 
Khigdom. 154 In this case, the applicants were four siblings who had been subjected 
to honific neglect and emotional abuse in their mother's home over a number of 
years. Social services visited the family several times from 1987 to 1993 and, 
despite concerns over their ill treatment voiced by their grandmother, neighbours, 
general practitioner, head teacher, and by the National Society for the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Children, the local authority failed to remove the children from the 
harmful environment. The applicants attempted to sue the local authority for 
damages for breach of statutory duty concerning the discharge of their duties 
relating to the welfare of children under the Children Act 1989, and for 
negligence. Their application, however, was struck out on the grounds that no 
action Jay against the local authority in those grounds. That strike out decision 
was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. 
152 A v United Kingdom, above n 136, para 21. 
153 Ibid, para 22. 
154 Zand Others v United Kingdom, above n 136. 
39 
The applicants took their complaint to the European Court arguing, inter 
alia, that their article 3 tight had been breached by the local authority's failure to 
protect them from inhuman and degrading treatment. The Court reiterated the 
obligation it had found under article 3 in A v United Kingdom: 155 
The court re-iterates that art 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of 
democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. The obligation on high contracting parties 
under art l of the convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in the convention, taken together with art 3, 
requires states to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their 
jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, 
including such ill-treatment administered by private individuals (see A v UK 
(1998) 5 BHRC 137 at para 22). These measures should provide effective 
protection, in particular, of children and other vulnerable persons and include 
reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities had or ought to 
have had knowledge 
While the Court recognised that social services faced difficult and 
sensitive decisions, and had to observe the principle to respect and preserve 
family life, there had nonetheless been a failure of the system to protect these 
applicants from "serious, Jong-term neglect and abuse." 156 As such, a violation of 
Article 3 was found. 
4 Obligations not read into Article 3 
The EctHR has not read the obligations to train and educate all personnel 
involved in the custody, intetTogation or treatment of detained individuals and to 
systematically review intetTogation rule into Article 3. The omission of these 
obligations can be explained by reference to the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment157 
("the CPT"). Established by the Council of Europe in 1987, the CPT pays periodic 
and ad hoe visits to places of detention within the States parties "to examine the 
155 Ibid, para 73 . 
156 Ibid, para 74. 
157 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Puni hment (11 November 1987) 1561 UNTS 363. 
40 
treatment of persons deprived of their liberty with a view to strengthening, if 
necessary, the protection of such persons from torture and from inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment."
158 
The CPT has thus read a number of procedural safeguards in Article 3, 
including detailed rules on the conduct of interrogations and the obligations of 
authorities in charge of detained individuals.
159 Unlike the EctHR, the CPT has 
only recommendatory powers. As such, these obligations cannot be enforced 
against States parties.
160 
B United Kingdom 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) ("the HRA") incorporates the rights 
contained in the ECHR into the domestic Jaw of the United Kingdom. However, 
apart from the ju1isprudence generated by applications from the United Kingdom, 
the State is not bound by the jurisprudence of the EctHR. Section 2(1) of the HRA 
only requires the courts to 'take account' of ECHR jurisprudence.
161 The above 
cited decisions on the prohibition of extradition that exposes individuals to the 
risk of conduct prohibited under Article 3, and the horizontal application of the 
Article 3 right, are thus directly binding on the United Kingdom. 
In A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2/
62 
the House of Lords had to decide whether evidence allegedly obtained by the use 
of torture overseas was admissible in English judicial proceedings. The Court 
unanimously answered this question in the negative. 
The appellants in this case were non-UK nationals who had been certified 
as suspected international terrorists pursuant to the Anti-terrorism Crime and 
Security Act 2001 (UK) (ACSA). ACSA was introduced as a response to the 9/11 
158 Ibid, art l. 
159 See generally, M Evans and R Morgan Preventing Torture: A Study of th e European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(Oxford University Press , Oxford, 1998) 251-253 and 257-295. 
160 N Rodley, above n 20, 165. 
161 R Clayton and H Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights: Volume 1 (Oxford University Press , 
Oxford, 2000) 133-135 . 
162 [2006) 2 AC 221. 
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teJTorist attacks in United States of America. Section 21 allowed the Secretary of 
State to issue a certificate against any non-British citizen whose presence in the 
UK he or she believed to be a risk to national security, and also reasonably 
suspected of being a terrorist, as defined in the Act. Section 23 authorised the 
detention of such a person, whether temporarily or indefinitely. Section 25 
allowed that person to appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
(SIAC) against their certification . On appeal, the SIAC must cancel the certificate 
if "there are no reasonable grounds for a belief or suspicion of the kind referred to 
in s21 (a) or (b)" or if the SIAC "considers that for some other reason the 
certificate should not have been issued." 
The appellants raised the issue of evidence obtained through off-shore 
torture during their appeal to the SIAC. The SIAC found that the question whether 
evidence had, or might have been, procured by torture inflicted by foreign 
officials without the complicity of the British authorities was relevant to the 
weight of the evidence but did not render it legally inadmissible. A majority of the 
Court of Appeal upheld this decision. 163 The appellants based their appeal to the 
House of Lords on three main points: the common Jaw of England, the ECHR and 
principles of public international law. 
The third head of appeal is the most relevant for this paper. Here, the 
appellants conceded that generally, a treaty has no binding force unless it is given 
effect by statute or it expresses principles of customary international law. 
However, they relied upon the p1inciple that a statute which is passed after the 
date of a treaty and which deals with the same subject matter, must be construed, 
if it is reasonably capable of such a meaning, as intended to carry out the treaty 
obligation and not to be inconsistent with it. 164 ACSA must thus be interpreted 
consistently with UNCAT. They also relied upon the obligations under the HRA 
to take account of Strasbourg jurisprudence in connection with a convention 
right, 165 to interpret and give effect to p1imary and subordinate legislation in a 
163 See A and others v Secretary of State [2004] All ER 62. 
164 A and oth ers v Secretary of State f or th e Home Depart111ent ( No 2) [2006) 2 AC 221 , 254 (HL) 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill. 
165 Human Rights Act 1998, s 2. 
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way which is compatible with convention rights so far as possible, 
166 and to not 
act incompatibly with a convention right.
167 
Lord Bingham of Comhill summarised the appellants' argument rn the 
following steps: 
168 
1) The convention is not to be interpreted in a vacuum, but taking account of other 
international obligations to which member states are subject, as the European 
Court has in practice done. 
2) The prohibition of torture enjoys the highest normative force recognised by 
international law. 
3) The international prohibition of torture requires states not merely to refrain from 
authorising or conniving at torture but also to suppress and discourage the 
practice of torture and not to condone it. 
4) Article 15 of the Torture Convention requires the exclusion of statements made 
as a result of torture as evidence in any proceedings. 
5) Court decisions in many countries have given effect directly or indirectly to art 
15 of the Torture Convention. 
6) The rationale of the exclusionary rule in art 15 is found not only in the general 
unreliability of evidence procured by torture but also in its offensiveness to 
civilised values and its degrading effect on the administration of justice. 
7) Measures directed to counter the grave dangers of international terrorism may 
not be permitted to undermine the international prohibition of torture. 
Their Lordships unanimously concluded that evidence procured by a 
foreign State through torture cannot be used in a judicial proceeding against a 
suspected teITorist. Lord Bingham held that article 15 of UNCAT should be given 
force through Articles 3 and 5(4) of the ECHR - which is analogous to our courts 
using section 9 of the Bill of Rights to give effect to UNCAT. 
169 He also held that 
"the principles of the common law do not stand alone. Effect must be given to the 
European Convention, which itself takes account of the all but universal 
consensus embodied in the Torture Convention." Lord Carswell, however, held 
that reading UNCAT into the domestic law was "not without ... difficulties", and 
also unnecessary, considering the common law is able to accommodate the 
166 Ibid, s 3. 
167 Ibid, s 6. 
168 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department ( No 2) [2006] 2 AC 221, 255 (HL) 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill. 
169 Ibid, para 270-272 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill. 
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p1inciples involved. 170 Regardless of the differences in reasoning, the decision in 
A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) is significant in 
the extensive references made by their Lordships to international obligations for 
the prevention of torture. 171 The obligation under UNCAT to reject evidence 
obtained through torture undoubtedly influenced the House of Lords in rejecting 
the Government's case. 172 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights 173 (the Committee) recently 
reported on the United Kingdom's compliance with UNCAT. 174 The Committee 
noted that the United Kingdom Government is under both negative and positive 
obligations under UNCA T to protect against acts of torture. It noted with concern 
that the Government did not appear to sufficiently appreciate these obligations, as 
evidenced by its argument in A v Secretary of State (No 2) that the non-
incorporation of UNCAT into domestic law allowed the admittance of evidence 
obtained by t01ture abroad; proposals to rely on diplomatic assurances to deport 
people to countries which practise t01ture; and the lack of official inquiry into 
allegations of the use of United Kingdom airp01ts in "extraordinary renditions." 175 
The Committee recommended that the Department of Constitutional 
Affairs, the Government Department with central responsibility for ensuring the 
Government complied with UNCAT, should provide guidance and advice on 
UNCAT obligations to other Government Departments - particularly in relation to 
the positive obligations to take steps to prevent and to investigate acts of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment. Also, the Committee recommended that the 
proposed new Commission for Equality and Human Rights should have a role in 
ensuring UNCAT compliance, by scrutinising Government policy and practice for 
170 Ibid, para 151 per Lord Carswell. See also Lord Hope at para 112. 
171 Ibid, para 27-45 Lord Bingham; see also 111-112 Lord Hope of Craighead. 
172 Joint Committee on Human Rights The UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT) (18 May 
2006) Nineteenth Report of Session 2005-06, Vol l Report and formal minutes. para 28 . 173 Appointed by the House of Lords and the House of Commons to consider matters relating to 
human rights in the United Kingdom (excluding individual cases); proposals for remedial orders, 
draft remedial orders and remedial orders . The Joint Committee is made up of 6 members of the 
House of Lords and 6 members of the House of Commons. 
174 Joint Committee on Human Rights, above n 174. 
175 Ibid, para 39. All of these issues are considered further in the Report, but an analysis of each is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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compliance with both negative and positive obligations under
 UNCAT, and to 
d , 
h · h · 176 
recommen measures to improve t ose practices w ere appropri
ate. 
The om1ss1on of any reference to Article 3 m these recomme
ndations 
implicitly recognises that the obligation to fulfil these du
ties lies on the 
Government, but cannot be enforced through the HRA. 
C Canada 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 (the Charter) p
rovides 
for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms at domes
tic law in Canada. 
Section 12 provides everyone the "right not to be subjected to 
any cruel and 
unusual treatment or punishment." Despite the difference 
m wording, this 
provision is the equivalent to section 9 of the Bill of Rights.
177 The broader right 
to security of the person is also provided for in the protectio
n of fundamental 
justice in section 7 of the Charter. Canada has also ratified bo
th the ICCPR and 
UNCAT. 
The prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in section 12 d
oes not 
apply to acts carried out by foreign states. As such, the Suprem
e Court of Canada 
has unanimously held that extraditing a person to face trial in a 
country where the 
death penalty is available does not violate section 12.
178 Instead, the Court relied 
on the principles of fundamental justice to hold that such 
extradition would 
"shock the conscience" and breach section 7 of the Charter. Su
ch extradition can 
only proceed if the State seeks assurances from the receiving
 country that the 
death penalty will not be sought for extradited individuals.
179 
In Singh v Minister of Employment & lmmigration
180 the Supreme Court 
of Canada ruled that sending a t'efugee back to their country of origin wo
uld 
jeopardize their section 7 right. More recently however, in 
Suresh v Canada 
176 Ibid, para 41 and 42. 
177 See Taunoa v Attorney-General (31 August 2007) NZSC SC 6/2006,
 para 72-75, and 166-168 
Elias CJ. 
178 United States v Burns [2001] l SCR 283, para 50-57. 
179 Ibid. See also Hogg 50-12 -50-13. 
180 [1985] l SCR 177 . 
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(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 181 ("Suresh") the Court controversially 
left open the possibility of returning a person to face torture in unspecified 
exceptional circumstances. 182 The Canadian approach thus provides less 
protection against refoulement than international standards. 183 In the course of the 
judgement, the Court implies that Canada is not bound treaty obligations 
regarding non-refoulement to torture because those obligations had not been 
formally incorporated: 184 
Insofar as Canada is unable to deport a person where there are 
substantial grounds to believe he or she would be tortured on return, this is not 
because Article 3 of the CAT directly constrains the actions of the Canadian 
government, but because the fundamental justice balance under s 7 of the 
Charter generally precludes deportation to torture when applied on a case-by-
case basis. 
The Supreme Court of Canada thus treats international law as informing 
the guarantees in the Charter. It shows a high degree of deference to the 
Government, while at the same time playing down the role of international law. 
The Court's approach to the non-binding nature unincorporated international 
human rights obligations is further exemplified in the case of Mr Ahani. 
In Ahani v Canada (Attorney General/85 , a judgement that was delivered 
by the Supreme Court at the same time as Suresh, Mr Ahani was found to have 
provided insufficient evidence of a risk of being subjected to torture if he was 
deported to Iran, and his appeal against deportation failed. He took his case to the 
HRC, who asked Canada to stay his depo1tation until the petition was heard. The 
Government refused. Mr Ahani sought an injunction in the Onta1io Court of 
Appeal to stay the deportation. By a majo1ity, the Court held that the Committee's 
views were non-binding and unenforceable, and that to accept Mr Ahani's claim 
would tum a non-binding unincorporated treaty obligation into a constitutional 
181 (2002) l SCR 3. 
182 Ibid, para 77-78. 
183 Compare the absolute prohibition on such return as outlined in Chahal v United Kingdom. 184 Ibid, para 60 
185 r2002J sec 2. 
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principle of fundamental justice. 
186 Mr Ahani was denied leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court, and subsequently deported.
187 
D Summary 
Various obligations have been read into the respective 'torture' protecti
ons 
m the ECHR, the HRA (UK) and the Canadian Charter. A compari
son of the 
jurisprudence from these sources indicates that is not an international
 consensus 
on the extent to which extra preventive and remedial measures must b
e read into 
'torture' protections. The ECtHR leads the field, reading a vast numb
er of such 
obligations into Article 3 of the ECHR and pushing the bounda
ry of the 
application of such protections to private parties. The United Kingdom
 is bound 
by many of these obligations. Further, the judiciary in the United King
dom have 
shown an increased receptivity to international human rights obligation
s, perhaps 
reflecting the intent behind the HRA - to 'bring rights home'. By co
ntrast, the 
Canadian courts do not consider themselves bound to comply 
with the 
international human rights obligations. 
Despite the differences in the treatment of the weight of international 
law 
obligations, all three jurisdictions recognise a form of the non-re
foulement 
obligation. The obligation to ensure certain preventive measures are in
 place has 
also been recognised, although the lack such measures has not, of i
tself, been 
sufficient to find a breach. 
VIII CAN THESE OBLIGATIONS BE READ INTO THE BILL 
OF 
RIGHTS? 
In Clark, the court considers that existing statutory mechanisms whic
h 
protect the preventive rights of UN CAT negate the need to read these obligation 
into section 9. However, the existence of these mechanisms does not n
ecessarily 
negate the need to read them into the Bill of Rights. Policy, after all, c
an change 
and statutes can be easily repealed. 
186 A/zani v Canada (2002) 58 OR (3d) (CA) 107, para 33. 
187 See generally Audrey Macklin "Mr Suresh and The Evil Twin" (2002) 20
 Refuge 15. 
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Reading all the obligations into the Bill of Rights would also make them 
easier to enforce. With the current array of statutory mechanisms fulfilling various 
obligations, the Government could unintentionally decrease New Zealand ' s 
protection of these rights. Reading these protections into section 9 will provide a 
more robust protection against torture and other ill treatment. It will serve to raise 
public awareness of these rights, and lessen the likelihood of these rights being 
abrogated through legislation. 
However, there are at least three difficulties with reading these obligations 
into the Bill of Rights . The first is concerned with the constitutionality of 
enforcing obligations that Parliament left out of the implementing legislation. The 
second and third focus on the nature of the obligations, and whether it is 
appropriate to impose these obligations on the State through the Bill of Rights and 
through the courts. 
A Legislative Under-Incorporation of Treaty Obligations 
The Torture Act, which implements UNCAT into New Zealand law, omits 
many UNCAT obligations. Reading those obligations through the Bill of Rights 
thus raises the risk of acting contrary to Parliamentary intention, as identified by 
Associate Judge Gendall in Clark. As outlined above, the omission of these 
obligations from the To1ture Act does not appear to have been a deliberate 
decision of Parliament to retain discretion as to the further implementation of 
these obligations. However, regardless of the reason for the omission, it is 
submitted that the under-incorporation of UNCAT does present a complete bar 
against reading these obligations into the Bill of Rights for at least three reasons. 
First, the Supreme Court relied explicitly on UNCAT for support in 
reading an implied non-refoulement protection into the Bill of Rights. 188 The 
Cou1t clearly did not consider the limited legislative incorporation of UNCAT an 
impediment to invoking the presumption of consistency. The reliance on UNCAT 
obligations in Zaoui , however, does not necessa1ily mean all the UNCAT 
obligations can be treated the same. Those obligations that require the State to do 
188 Zaoui v Attorney-General ( No 2), above n 3, 318-319 Keith J for the Court. 
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more than refrain from taking an action might be construed differently. This is 
considered below. 
Secondly, many obligations similar to those found in UNCAT have been 
read into Articles 7 and 10(1) of the ICCPR. In enacting the Bill of Rights with 
direct reference to the ICCPR, Parliament was clearly intending to ensure New 
Zealand complied with its international obligations.
189 The HRC jurisprudence on 
these obligations thus provides strong support for reading them into sections 9 
and/or 23(5). 
Associate Judge Gendall's concern in Clark that, due to the Jack of any 
explicit obligations in the language of section 9, reading such obligations into the 
Bill of Rights would usurp parliamentary intention is unfounded. The nature of 
the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights requires them to be phrased in broad 
language, rather than minute detail. Interpreting section 9 with a literal and nan-ow 
approach like this unduly nan-ows the scope of the provision, and goes against the 
grain of the 'broad and purposive' interpretation necessary in order to give 
individuals the 'full measure of their rights' 
190
. Such an approach is ill suited to 
Bill of Rights interpretation. Also, the New Zealand courts have frequently had 
recourse to ICCPR jurisprudence in order to interpret the Bill of Rights. The 
similar used in both instruments indicates Parliament intended section 9 and 23(5) 
to be interpreted consistently with ICCPR jmisprudence. 
Thirdly, the recent implementation of the Optional Protocol through the 
Torture Act indicates Parliament's greater willingness to be held to account over 
its international obligations to ensure the humane treatment of prisoners. The 
National Preventive Mechanisms and the Subcommittee will be able to assess the 
State's compliance with certain obligations that have not been explicitly 
incorporated into domestic law - such as the provision of appropriate education 
and training to prison staff. It is submitted that this development lessens the 
"repugnancy" of allowing the courts to consider similar issues under the Bill of 
Rights. 
189 Ministry of Justice, above n 50, para 4.21-4.23; see also K Keith "The Role of International 
Human Rights Law in NZ" (1997) 32 Tex Int ' I L J 410. 
190 Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 268 (CA) Cooke P. 
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B The Nature of the Obligations 
1 Non-Justiciability 
The second difficulty encountered in attempting to read these obligations 
into the Bill of Rights is the nature of some of these obligations. The obligations 
which are within the "traditional" purview of the courts - such as ensuring 
evidence obtained through torture is inadmissible - are clearly within the 
competence courts to decide. However, the courts are understandably more 
reluctant to address "political" resource questions. 191 The obligations to prosecute 
an alleged torturer, to train officials, to systematically review interrogation 
procedures, and to investigate allegations of torture all require a Court to venture 
into resource allocation issues. 
Decisions as to the allocation of State resources are the domain of 
democratically-elected bodies. It is considered inappropriate for the unelected and 
unaccountable judiciary to enter this domain. 192 Opposite, and in tension with, this 
view is the need for courts to fulfil their constitutional responsibility for 
protecting the citizen against infringements of their rights by the State - a role that 
has been explicitly recognised by the Bill of Rights. A South African judge has 
pointed out that the unelected role of the judiciary can work to its advantage when 
· h · h 193 protecting uman ng ts: 
When it comes to matters of deep principle, [the judiciary's) lack of 
accountability actually becomes a virtue. We are not running for office, and 
electoral popularity is of no concern to us. We defend deep core values which 
are part of world jurisprudence and part of the evolving constitutional 
traditions of our country. Our lack of accountability in these circumstances 
becomes a "plus". 
191 For example, Lawson v Housing New Zealand (1996) 3 HRNZ 285 (HC); Attorney-General v 
Daniels [2003] 2 NZLR 742 (CA). 
192 A Sachs "Social and Economic Rights: Can They Be Made Justiticiable?" (2000) 53 SMU L 
Rev 1381, 1388. 
193 Ibid. 
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New Zealand is not short of examples of the risk that the legislature's 
susceptibility to "electoral popularity" can pose to fundamental human rights.
194 
That risk is especially great in relation to individuals who are under arrest, or 
imprisoned for a crime. Human rights breaches of such individuals tend to gamer 
little public sympathy and consequently those individuals are most in need of the 
courts to regulate the conduct of the legislature in relation to their fundamental 
rights. 195 
Another limitation on the comts is the unsuitability of the adversarial 
litigation process for deciding issues of resource allocation. Policy judgements 
require extensive social inqui1ies and an evaluation of a mix of different factors, 
as opposed to simply resolving a dispute between parties. 
196 For example, a claim 
against the State for failing to properly train officials would require the court to 
investigate the adequacy of that training to determine whether the obligation was 
breached. Litigation in an adversary process is not the ideal way to conduct that 
inquiry. 197 The court would need all the relevant information from the government 
before it could investigate further, and techniques of having amicus curiae briefs 
from the government have not developed in New Zealand.
198 
2 Positive Obligations and the 'Process Theory' of Rights 
Related to this issue of allowing courts to enter judgement on political, 
resource allocation questions is the issue of the appropriateness of imposing these 
positive obligations on the State through the Bill of Rights. 
194 For example, the enactment of a retrospective penalty in order to punish 'home invasion' 
offenders, in breach of their rights against double jeopardy and retroactive penalities: see R v 
Pownako [2000] 2 NZLR 695 (CA); R v Pora [2001) 2 NZLR 37 (CA). 
195 For example, consider the public uproar over the compensation paid to prisoners for breaches of 
theirs 9 and s 23(5) rights in Taunoa v Attorney-General. The Government responded to that 
uproar by enacting the Prisoners and Victims Compensation Act. See generally, K Dawkins and M 
Briggs "Review: Criminal Law" (2005) 3 NZLR 393, 413-420. 
196 I L M Richardson "The Role of Judges as Policy Makers" (1985) 15 VUWLR 46, 49. 
197 Geiringer, C and Palmer, M "Human Rights and Social Policy in New Zealand" (2007) 30 
Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 12, 38; Richardson, above n 195, 49. 
198 Richardson, above n 195, 49-50; But note, the Supreme Court in R v Hansen recently signalled 
it was open to receiving such information from the Crown, albeit it was rejected in this case due to 
late submission. 
SI 
The Bill of Rights protects civil and political rights. These can be classed 
m three groups: those that regulate procedures followed by the State in its 
dealings with individuals; those that protect rights to participate in political and 
social processes; and certain basic, fundamental rights. 199 The first two groups are 
concerned solely with process, and do not affect the substance of the law. The 
rights in the third group, however, do affect the substance of the law. For 
example, the right to be free from torture and other ill treatment, which is located 
within this third group, cannot be abrogated by Parliament allowing torture. The 
substantive impediment that this group of rights imposes upon Parliament is 
justified by the fundamental nature of these rights, broadly agreed to in the 
international community, and the need to protect minority rights. 200 
While the nature of the rights in the Bill of Rights generally restrains the 
State from acting in a particular way, in ce1tain situations the State is required to 
take action in order to avoid breaching the right. 201 For example, the right to legal 
aid imposes a duty on "the government to maintain and fund a system for the 
evaluation of applications and the assigning of lawyers."202 
However, as Jeremy Waldron points out, rights do not have a simple one-
to-one relation with duties. 203 A particular duty that is associated with a right itself 
generates waves of duties that back it up: 204 
The right not to be tortured, for example, clearly generates a duty not to 
torture. But, in various circumstances, that simple duty will be backed up by 
others: a duty to instruct people about the wrongfulness of torture; a duty to 
be vigilant about the danger of, and temptation to, torture; a duty to 
ameliorate situations in which torture might be thought likely to occur; and 
so on. 
199 Keith, K Otago Law review 1986 Val 6 No 2 209-211 
200 Ibid. 
201 Compare the strict 'negative obligations only' approach under the US Constitution in DeShaney 
v Winnebago Social Services Department (1989) 489 US 189, 203 Rehnquist CJ. 
202 P Rish worth "Interpreting and Applying the Bill of Rights" in Rish worth et al The New Zealand 
Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2003) 60. 
203 J Waldron "Rights in Conflict" in J Waldron (ed) Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993) 212. 
204 Ibid. 
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These waves of duties can be likened to the range of obligations that 
UNCAT and the ICCPR impose upon States parties. The obligation not to engage 
in torture and other ill treatment is clearly established at both international and 
domestic law. The obligation not to expose individuals to risk of that treatment by 
sending them to a place where they may be subjected to torture or other ill 
treatment is a "second wave" on that initial prohibition. It is one step removed 
from engaging in acts of torture or other ill treatment directly, but is clearly 
necessary in order to effectively protect an individual's right not to be subjected to 
such treatment. 
The duties to investigate allegations of a breach, and to train and educate 
personnel who involved in the custody of detained persons are designed to futther 
reduce the risk of torture or other ill treatment, and impose additional waves of 
duties upon the State 
The orthodox position under the Bill of Rights is that positive action is 
only required by the State where it is necessary in order to avoid a breach of a 
right.205
 That is, those bound under section 3 of the Bill of Rights are not required 
to take acts that will maximise the enjoyment of a right.
206 However, as Waldron's 
'waves of duties' model exemplifies, the right to be free from torture and other ill 
treatment generates duties which are required, not to 'maximise' enjoyment of the 
right, but to ensure the right is effectively protected. 
IX CONCLUSION 
The prohibition on torture is recognised as a fundamental right. It protects 
physical security, an interest which is vital for safeguarding the inherent dignity of 
the person. History attests to the insufficiency of ex-post facto measures to protect 
the right to be free from torture and other ill tt'eatment. The problem is not an 
offshore one: New Zealand does not have an impeccable track record for ensuring 
prisoners are treated with humanity and respect for inherent dignity. 
205 P Rishworth, above n 201, 210 quoting Platform 'Artze Fur Das Leben ' v Austria ' (1988) 13 
EI-IRR 204 (ECHR). 
206 Mendelssohn v Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 268,273 (CA) Keith J for the Court; P 
Rish worth, above n 201, 222. 
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Individuals who are deprived of liberty are particularly vulnerable to 
infringements on their right to bodily integrity, and on their right to be treated 
with humanity. A number of the obligations formulated at international law to 
protect the right to be free from torture and other ill treatment address this 
particular vulnerability. 
Protection against torture requires states to take some action to prevent its 
occurrence - anything less would be mere 'window-dressing' of the right. The 
Solicitor-General's acceptance that the State is under an obligation to act 
according to its international obligations in Zaoui, as well as the recent legislative 
implementation of the Optional Protocol evidence a greater willingness on of the 
part of both the executive and the legislature recently to act consistently with 
these obligations. 
However, as submitted earlier, reading these obligations into the Bill of 
Rights will provide a more robust protection of these rights , and will also ensure 
the judiciary can fulfil their "constitutional role" in safeguarding the rights 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 207 
207 Richardson, above n 195 , 49-50. 
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